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I. INTRODUCTION
T he scales of judicial decision in the United States traditionally havebeen tilted toward the interests of the owners of copyrights or works
of art. This imbalance has operated to the detriment of the creative
artists who wish to maintain some degree of control over the artistic
integrity of their creations, or to enjoy some measure of the artwork's
* This note has been entered in the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers' 1986 Nathan Burkan Memorial Writing Competition.
Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension
of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1542 (1972). This Note's author
observes that the "tilted scale", which favors copyright proprietors, and not creators of
artwork, "has never been leveled [in the United States] by weight of statutory revision,
judicial recognition of the doctrine of moral right, or adoption of the Berne Convention." The
Berne Convention, an international copyright agreement with more than seventy signato-
ries, defines minimum, mandatory copyright standards for its members. In addition, the
Berne Convention gives formal recognition to the artists' rights doctrine of moral right.
Moral rights survive the sale of works of art and grant to the artist certain restraints on the
owner's disposition of the artwork. The United States has refused membership in this
organization.
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increased worth. Over the past decade there has been a groundswell of
support developing in the United States for the expansion of artists'
rights both of an economic and personality2 nature. The Copyright Act of
19763 offers increased protection to creative artists, 4 and proposals have
surfaced to further artists' economic rights through doctrines of resale
royalties, 5 public lending rights,6 increased tax breaks for artists,
7
2 Personality rights refer to those rights which arise from the unique creative
relationship between an artist and his work. The personality rights, for purposes of this
Note, encompass not only the right of paternity, which allows an artist to claim authorship
of one of his creations or disclaim authorship if the work has been altered and the artist no
longer acknowledges it as his own, but also the right of integrity, which allows the artist to
object to any distortion, alteration, mutilation, or destruction of his work. The personality
rights survive the transfer of ownership of the artwork. L. DuBoFF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART
LAW 797-803 (1977). The terms "personality right" and "moral rights" are used interchange-
ably throughout this paper.
' The 1976 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§
101-810) (1982).
' The 1976 Copyright Act has demonstrated a heightened sensitivity to the needs of the
creative artist. Barbara Ringer, former Register of Copyrights and a participant in the
drafting of the 1976 Act, has written that the Act as a whole "mark[s] a break with a
two-hundred-year-old tradition that has identified copyright more closely with the pub-
lisher than with the author." Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 NY.L.
ScH. L. REV. 477, 490 (1977). For example, the right of termination allows an author or his
heirs to reclaim, after a specified period, any work other than a work made for hire, which
was granted under transfer or license of a copyright. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (1982). In
addition, under §§ 203(a)(5) and 304(c)(5) the author or his heirs is guaranteed the right to
terminate a grant and any right under it "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary."
In Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 105 S. Ct. 638 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held
that the purpose of these sections was
to provide added benefits to authors. The extension of the duration of existing
copyrights to 75 years, the provision of a longer term (the author's life plus 50
years) for new copyrights, and the concept of a termination right itself, were all
obviously intended to make the rewards for the creativity of authors more
substantial. More particularly, the termination right was expressly intended to
relieve authors of the consequences of ill-advised and unrenumerative grants that
had been made before the author had a fair opportunity to appreciate the true
value of his work product.
Id. at 650.
The 1976 Copyright Act also recognizes the composer's right to have the "basic melody"
or "fundamental character" of his composition undistorted by a subsequent recording of the
work. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1982). This appears to be the first formal recognition of the
personality right on the federal level. See Rosen, Droit Moral for Musical Compositions:
Section 115 of the New Copyright Act, 5 ART & L. 88 (1980).
For a discussion of the copyright system and how it can be used by artists to secure many
of the rights available under the moral rights doctrine, see Stroup, Practical Guide to the
Protection of Artists Through Copyright, Tradesecret, Patent and Trademark Law, 3
CoMM/EN r 189 (1981); Tondro, The Copyright Act as Governmental Policy, J. ARTS MGMT. &
L., Spring 1983, at 149.
5 Only one state has ever recognized the right of the artist to share in the increased
market value of his work after its initial sale. The Resale Royalty Act, ch. 1228, § 1, 1976
Stat 5544 (1976) (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE § 986)(West 1986), sets aside for the original
[Vol. 34:441
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss3/7
19861 RIGHTING THE "TILTED SCALE" 443
artist of a work of fine art a five percent royalty on the gross price of each subsequent sale
within the terms of the Act if the seller resides, or the sale is executed, in California.
However, a subsequent amendment in 1982, § 986(b)(2), (4) limited application of the Act to
the resale of those works of fine art with a gross sales price of $1,000 or more and to resales
for a price the same or in excess of the purchase price paid by the seller.
Fine art for the purposes of the Act means "an original painting, sculpture, or drawing,
or an original work of art in glass." Id. § 986(c)(2). Section 997 of the Civil Code added
porcelain painting and stained glass artistry to the classification of fine art in 1983.
The right to collect the royalty fee cannot be waived unless by a written contract to
receive in excess of five per cent of the amount of sale. The right to collect the royalty may,
however, be assigned. Id. § 986(a). This right to royalties inures to the artist's heirs,
legatees or personal representatives until the twentieth anniversary of the artist's death.
Id. § 986(a)(7). Failure to pay the royalty may result in an action for damages within three
years from the date of the sale, or one year after its discovery, whichever is longer. The
artist may bring an action for damages, and the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable
attorney fees. Id. § 986(a)(3). It is the responsibility of the seller to locate the artist, or,
within ninety days, deposit the amount of the royalty with the state Arts Council for the
artist's benefit. Id. § 986(a)(2). If, after seven years from the date of sale the artist has not
been located, the money is transferred to the council for the use of acquiring fine art
pursuant to the Art in Public Buildings Program. Id. § 986(a)(5).
The California statute reflects the French theory of droit de suit, or follow-up right, and
in effect ensures to visual artists a right parallel to the royalty rights of writers and
composers. It is basically an economic right but reflects the personality right premise that
the artist maintains a unique relationship with his creation.
Controversy has greeted passage of the Act and its constitutionality was challenged in
Morseburg v. Balyon, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 518, affd, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 983 (1980). The district court rejected plaintiff art dealer's arguments of
preemption, impairment of the right to contract, and violation of the due process clause and
praised the legislation as "the very type of innovative lawmaking that our federalist system
is designed to encourage." 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 520. District Judge Takasugi held as
follows:
The California legislature has evidently felt that a need exists to offer further
encouragement to and economic protection of artists. That is a decision which the
courts shall not lightly reverse. An important index of the moral and cultural
strength of a people is their official attitude towards, and nurturing of, a free and
vital community of artists. The California Resale Royalties Act may be a small
positive step in such a direction.
Id.
Presently, a purchaser of fine art in California acquires it res transit cum suo onere, i.e.,
the artwork passes with the burden of future royalty fees to the artist in case of resale. For
a discussion of the impact of this legislation vis-a-vis property rights, see infra text
accompanying notes 120-29.
' Proceeding on the assumption that an author should be compensated for any use of
his intellectual creation, the public lending right requires payment of a fee to the author
each time a book is lent out by a library or, in some jurisdictions, used in a reference room.
This right is generally given only to native authors in recognition of an encouragement for
their contributions to the national culture and identity. Funds for these payments are
raised by government appropriation and are distributed by collecting societies. The
countries of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
West Germany, Australia, and Great Britain have adopted the public lending right. See
Seemann, A Look at the Public Lending Right, 30 COPvROHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 71, 116-17
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regulation of dealings between dealers and artists,8 and the public
purchase and display of artworks.9 Such activity has prompted commen-
tators to refer to this movement as a "turn to populism" in the arts.10
Professor Goetsel, a board member of the Bay Area Lawyers for the Arts
in San Francisco, stated: "I don't want artists to be the only socialists in
a capitalistic society.""
In the area of personality rights, courts have displayed a more sluggish
but growing sensitivity to the needs of the creative artist and a willing-
ness to protect artists' rights through the use of traditional common law
doctrines and the innovative application of statutes. Most important to
the growing body of artists' rights, however, is the legislation recently
(1983). Although a bill designed to study this concept was introduced in the House of
Representatives by Ogden Reid of New York in 1973, it died in committee. H.R. 4850, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 1067 (1973). For a complete discussion and history of this
concept and the feasibility of its accommodation into the American copyright laws see
Seemann, supra.
Apart from the bookkeeping and other paperwork involved in carrying out an endeavor
of this magnitude in the United States, it would not be wise to open the door on such an
amorphous area. The theory behind the public lending right could be logically extended to
reimburse artists whose works are viewed by spectators strolling through museums. It
might be further extended to works of sculpture displayed in public places. An effort to
reimburse every creative artist each time his artwork is viewed or enjoyed would be an
administrative nightmare.
' Seven states, Arkansas, California, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Oregon, and South
Carolina, have enacted legislation allowing artists to deduct from their state income tax the
fair market value of all artworks which they donate to museums, in contrast to previous
allowance for costs of materials only. Flaherty, Art Law: Novel Legal Initiatives Are
Changing the Practice of an Unusual Specialty, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 3, 1984, at 24, col. 1.
The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 170(e) (1982), allows an artist deduction only for
the cost of materials, even though other individuals who donate works of art are allowed to
deduct the artwork's fair market value. See Maniscalo v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 632 F.2d 6 (T.C. 1980).
' E.g., The Art Dealer Relations Act, CAL. CIv. CODE § 1738 (West 1986). This Act
regulates consignment sales of artworks. Under the terms of this statute, art dealers are
held strictly liable for all loss or damage to works accepted on consignment. In addition,
consigned works and proceeds from their sales are considered "trust property" not subject to
claims of dealers' creditors.
' Maine, for example, has enacted the Percent for Art Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 27
§§ 451-459 (Supp. 1984), which states its purpose as follows: "Recognizing the need to
enhance culture and the arts and to encourage the development of artists, it is the intent of
the Legislature to provide funds for and authorize the acquisition of works of art for certain
public buildings and other facilities." Section 453 of the Act established a minimum amount
of one per cent of the total building appropriation or allocation, or $25,000, whichever is
less, to acquire such works.
The California Art in Public Building Program mandates allocation of monies for
purchase of works of art in public buildings. This statute also provides that artists whose
works are placed in public buildings have the right to claim authorship and retain and
exercise reproduction rights. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 15813.5 (West 1980).
io See Flaherty, supra note 7, at 1, col. 1.
SId. at 24, 26.
[Vol. 34:441
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss3/7
RIGHTING THE "TILTED SCALE"
enacted in California and New York1a2-legislation which openly recog-
nizes the "personality" interests of an artist in his work and his right to
protection of these interests, even after the sale of the artwork. While the
statutes of both states make significant strides in expanding artists'
rights, it is the California legislation which should be adopted as the
prototype of future legislation in this area since it stands as a unique
embodiment of the interests of the creative artist and the societal goal of
cultural preservation. Artists' rights legislation in the United States is
not comprehensive. It is highly probable and desirable that, as more
states enact legislation, the federal government will recognize the need
for uniformity in this area and will react by appending relevant federal
legislation to the Copyright Act. Furthermore, continued expansion of
artists' rights and control over artworks after sale will necessarily
mandate a new concept of art ownership and a reevaluation of traditional
property concepts in this area. A close examination reveals, however,
that the restrictions on ownership of artworks necessitated by artists'
rights legislation are not alien to American concepts of property owner-
ship and can be integrated into existing ownership expectations with a
minimum of adjustment.
This Note focuses on the expansion of artists' rights in the United
States, specifically the moral rights of paternity and integrity. It explores
the history of judicial denial of moral rights and the attempt to gain
protection through traditional causes of action. The Note then analyzes
barriers to adoption of the moral rights doctrine, with emphasis on the
challenge to traditional property concepts. The California Art Preserva-
tion Act of 1980 and the 1984 Artists' Authorship Act of New York are
discussed and evaluated. This Note recommends adoption of the Califor-
nia statute as the model for future artists' rights legislation and defends
property rights restrictions imposed by the Act on the basis of support of
legal precedent and the justification of protection of the public interest.
II. MORAL RIGHTs BACKGROUND
Artists' rights in the United States have been traditionally conceived
in terms of pecuniary interest,1 3 and as such have been protected by the
12 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 986, 987, 989 (West 1986); N.Y. ARTs & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 14.03
(McKinney Supp. 1986). The California legislation became effective in 1977, 1980, and
1983, respectively. The New York statute went into effect in 1984. The New York statute
originally enacted as N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 14.51-59 (McKinney 1984) was
repealed December 31, 1984 and simultaneously reenacted as § 14.03 (McKinney Supp.
1986). Due to policy statements contained in the original enactment this author will
occasionally cite to it.
13 The Copyright law rewards authors economically for their contribution to society. "By
giving authors a means of securing the economic reward afforded by the market, copyright
1986]
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1976 Copyright Act, which derives its authority from the U.S.
Constitution. 14 The American judiciary has not recognized personality or
moral rights. Yet, various other societies have recognized a complemen-
tary set of rights deriving from the creative artist's unique relationship
with his intellectual creation-a relationship which survives the
transfer of the physical object of art.'5 The creative artists enfuses a part
of his own personality and vision into his creation, thereby forming an
indissoluble bond between himself and his work. These rights are
referred to by different names. For example, in Germany they are
termed Urheberpersonlichkeitsrecht, or right of the author's personality,
and in France as the droit moral, or moral right. Because France has
been the most hospitable home to the development of these rights, the
term moral right has generally come to be designated in popular usage
to represent artists' personality rights, and has been incorporated into
the language of the Berne Convention,' 6 and hence the art world.
The moral rights of the author 17 may be divided into the two categories
of paternity and integrity which were recognized and adopted by the
Berne Convention at the time of its 1928 Rome revision.' 8 At that time,
Article 6bis of the Berne agreement articulated the concept of moral
rights as follows:
stimulates their creation and dissemination of intellectual works." A. LATMAN & R. GORMAN,
COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES, 12 (1981).
" U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, Cl. 8. "To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right in their respective
writings and discoveries."
15 This relationship was described within the context of a discussion of the California
Art Preservation Act as the "legal expression of an umbilical cord that attaches the artist
to his or her work." Gantz, Protecting Artists MoralRights: A Critique of the California Art
Preservation Act as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 873,874 n.6 (1981).
"e The Berne Convention is a multilateral treaty which mandates certain standards for
the protection of artistic and literary works. Melville Nimmer has said of the Berne
Convention: "It represents one of the earliest and in some ways most successful ventures
into world law." Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention
and the U.S. Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1967).
1 The term "author" is used interchangeably with "artist" throughout this paper to
designate the creator of literary, musical, or artistic works.
"s Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Rome Revision
(1928), 123 L.N.T.S. 233, 249-51.
Additional moral rights have been recognized under French law. The right of divulgation
establishes the artist as the sole arbiter of whether a work is ready to be presented to the
public. He or she may refuse to fulfill a contract on the ground of lack of inspiration and may
enjoin others from publishing an artwork which he or she has discarded. The 1957 French
codification of artistic and literary law established the right of an author involved in a
published contract to withdraw a work after publication provided he pay for all sold copies
of the work which he withdraws and pay damages to the publishers. See A. DIETZ, COPYRIGHT
LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrry 69-72 (1978); L. DuBoF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 797-806
(1977); Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506, 511-14 (1955).
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(1) Independently of the author's copyright, and even after
transfer of the said copyright, the author shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work, as well as the right to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.1 9
These rights were further expanded at the Stockholm revision of the
Berne Convention in 1967 and an additional provision was appended. 20
Article 6bis currently states:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after
the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honour or reputation. (2) The rights granted to the author in
accordance with the preceding paragraph shall, after his death,
be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights,
and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized
by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of
their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for
the protection after the death of the author of all the rights set out
in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights
may, after his death, cease to be maintained.21
The third provision of 6bis addresses methods of safeguarding the rights
delineated in the article and states that the "means of redress.., shall be
governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed." 22
This provision grants signatory countries discretion in their approach
and enforcement of moral rights and accounts for the latitude of inter-
pretation that exists among member countries.
The rights of paternity and integrity have been defined variously in
different countries, 23 but the paternity right generally includes the right
" See Berne Convention, supra note 18, at 249-51.
2' Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Stockholm
Revision (1967), 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 135.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 For a discussion of moral rights in Germany, see Marcus, The Moral Right of the
Artist in Germany, 25 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 93 (1980). For an analysis of the right
in France, see Diamond, Legal Protection for the "Moral Rights" of Authors and Other
Creators, 68 TRADE-MARK REP. 244 (1978); Giocanti, Moral Rights: Authors'Protection and
Business Needs, 10 J. INT'L LAW & ECON. 627 (1975); Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The
Problem ofProtection for the Underprivileged Artist Under the Copyright Law, 11 COPYRIGHT
L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1962).
1986]
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to credit the author, the right of protection of anonymity or of a
pseudonym, the right to protection against a false attribution, and the
right to object to excessive criticism and other attacks on the author's
personality and professional standing.24 The right of integrity includes
the right of the artist to modify the work and to prevent its mutilation or
distortion.25
There is also a divergence of practice concerning the duration of the
author's moral rights. While French law declares the right to be "perpet-
ual, inalienable and imprescriptible" and capable of being conferred on
heirs or third parties,26 German law ties the exercise of moral rights to
the author's copyright and such rights expire a fixed number of years
after his death. 27
Although many commentators trace the initial development of moral
right concepts to French jurisprudence, 28 these concepts are actually
more deeply rooted in Western culture. The sages of Jewish law were
conscious of the paternity rights of authors in very early times. The right
of an author to have his authorship recognized was first articulated in the
admonition to acknowledge one's sources; 29 one who did not identify his
sources was considered a thief under Jewish law, for by donning the garb
of another he made "the wise man no better than a fool. ' ' 30 During the
second century B.C., Aristophanes the Grammarian, while judging a
composition contest, noted that the contestants who plagiarized their
works were brought before a tribunal, sentenced as robbers, and thrust
out of the city. In considering this incident one commentator remarked:
"We now see in historical retrospect that, since the beginning of written
history, there has existed a moral or natural right of ownership to
24 See, e.g., A. DETZ, supra note 18, at 66-75; L. DuBOFF, supra note 2, at 797-803; A.
LATMAN & R. GORMAN, supra note 13, at 10-11; Comment, supra note 1, at 1540-45.
25 The right of integrity has been further expanded in California. Under the new
California Art Preservation Act, the artist may object to and obtain relief for destruction of
an artwork within the guidelines of the Act. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987 (West 1986). The Act for
Preservation of Cultural and Artistic Creations gives standing to a non-profit organization
in existence for at least three years at the time an action is filed to move for injunctive relief
to preserve or restore the integrity of a work of fine art of recognized quality and of
substantial public interest, CAL. Civ. CODE § 989 (West 1986).
26 Statutory and Case Law Concerning the Protection of Works of Applied Art, Designs,
and Models, 12 BULLETIN DU DROIT D'AuTEUR 17, 35 (citing French law, Copyright Statute,
Article 6).
27 Id. at 40 (citing German law, Federal Republic of Germany, Federal German
Copyright Law, Article 6).
28 E.g., Diamond, supra note 23, at 245; Comment, supra note 1, at 1540.
29 Gabay, Israel Adopts Moral Rights Law, 29 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'v U.S. 462 (1982).
30 Id.
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intellectual property, which manifests itself in different ways at different
times-but exists."'31
As for more modern origins, the French regard the moral rights of
authors as natural rights originating from the principles of the French
Revolution. The judicially-created doctrine of droit moral "arose from the
spirit.., and philosophy of individualism which accompanied the French
Revolution. '32 French law reflects the reasoning that if the creative artist
shares the fruits of his genius with the larger society he has the
prerogative to receive the respect which accompanies recognition of his
paternity and integrity rights. On the other hand, the United States has
recognized, with the rest of the nations of the world, the artist's material
interests, but has not promulgated federal laws in the area of moral
rights, despite the recognition of this concept by over seventy signatories
of the Berne Convention. 33
III. JUDICIAL TRADITION OF DENIAL OF MORAL RIGHTS
Some courts have demonstrated a willingness to provide remedies to
artists attempting to assert moral rights, but traditionally they have
opposed any attempt to seek judicial recognition of the doctrine. In
Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 34 the plaintiff, artist Alberto Vargas, contracted
with Esquire Magazine to produce drawings of women which became
known as the "Varga Girls."3 5 In the beginning of the business relation-
ship, the drawings were reproduced and published with Mr. Vargas'
name thereon. This practice continued for six years.36 After cancellation
of the contract, the defendant possessed twenty drawings by the artist
which had not been published. Esquire proceeded to publish these
drawings, entitling them "The Esquire Girl." 37 Vargas brought suit to
enjoin the reproduction of the pictures, alleging that they were wrong-
fully used as credit of authorship was not given and their publication
constituted a misrepresentation since the pictures appeared to be the
work of someone other than the plaintiff.8
31 Streibich, Moral Right of Ownership to Intellectual Property, Part I: From the
Beginning to the Age of Printing, 6 MEM. ST. UL. REV. 1, 35 (1975).
32 DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in
France and the U.S., 28 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y AM. 1, 7, 9 (1980).
-3 As of March 1, 1978, there were seventy signatories to the Berne Convention.
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, v (United
International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property)(1980).
34 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
35 Id. at 524.
a6 Id. at 523-24.
37 Id. at 524.
38 Id.
1986]
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The Seventh Circuit found that Vargas' contract had completely
divested him of "every vestige of title and ownership of the pictures, as
well as the right to their possession, control and use."39 Vargas' claim of
paternity under the moral right doctrine was dismissed as one "which
need[ed] little discussion." 40 The court reasoned that although "these
so-called 'moral rights' . . .are recognized by the civil law of certain
foreign countries,"4 1 the plaintiff's brief conceded that the doctrine had
not received acceptance in the United States and that neither legislation
nor previous court decisions had conferred such a right upon artists.
42
The court further held as follows:
What plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law in this
country to conform to that of certain other countries. We need not
stop to inquire whether such a change, if desirable, is a matter for
the legislative or judicial branch of the government; in any event,
we are not disposed to make any new law in this respect.43
In Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church,44 plaintiff, Alfred Crimi, won a
competition to design a fresco mural on the wall of the defendant
church.45 His sketches were approved by a selection committee, and he
subsequently completed the work.46 Pursuant to the contract which
governed the painting, the mural would become part of the church
building, and the mural's copyright was assigned to the church.47
Six years later Crimi returned to the church to check the effect of the
climatic conditions on the paints, but was barred from entering the
building.4 He was informed by the minister that the congregation had
been offended by Crimi's presentation of a bare-chested Christ and had
painted over the mural.49 Crimi neither received notification of the
decision to obliterate his work of art nor was he offered any opportunity
to retrieve it.
Crimi filed suite against the church seeking one of three forms of
equitable relief: removal of the paints covering the mural; permission to
remove the mural from the church at the expense of the defendant; or
39 Id. at 525.
40 Id. at 526.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
41 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1949).
45 Id. at 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
46 Id.
47 Id.
'8 This fact was not included in the opinion. For a discussion of the circumstances of
Crimi's discovery of the destruction of his work, see Cernik & Feuer, Artists Have Rights
Too, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 16, 1982, at 13, cot. 1.
'9 194 Misc. at 571, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
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damages if the mural could not be removed so He asserted, in addition to
the traditional argument of breach of custom and usage, that the
destruction of his mural violated his integrity interest. His integrity
right was protected by a limited proprietary interest in his work after
sale to the extent reasonably necessary to protect his honor and reputa-
tion. 51
In a decision reminiscent of Vargas v. Esquire, the New York Supreme
Court held that an artist retains no rights in his work after its sale,
absent a contractual provision to the contrary.5 2 The court was not
convinced by Crimi's reference to the right of integrity offered in civil law
countries 53 and tersely commented that such a position "is not supported
by the decisions of our courts." 4
Another more recent case which attempted to assert moral rights,
Geisel v. Poynter Products,55 involved the manufacture, promotion, and
sale of dolls based on drawings by plaintiff Geisel, better known as Dr.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 572, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
" Id. at 577, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819. This holding is consistent with the majority of
jurisdictions. In all states except California and New York, an artist must secure his
paternity and integrity rights after sale by means of a contract. In response to this need for
a contract protecting artists' interests after sale, the Artist's Reserved Rights Transfer and
Sale Agreement was developed in 1971. Better known as the Projansky contract, after its
draftsman-attorney Robert Projansky, the contract was the result of interviews with
hundreds of artists, lawyers, collectors, and dealers. Under the terms of the Projansky
contract, the artist receives fifteen per cent of the appreciated value of the artwork if it is
alienated by the buyer, passes by operation of law, or is destroyed and insurance proceeds
are collected. The purchasing party to the contract must also agree to procure any
subsequent purchaser's agreement to the contract. Under the terms of the contract, the
artist reserves the right to receive notice and consent to the work's exhibit, to copy or
reproduce it, and after 120 days' notice to the owner to take temporary custody for
exhibition. The artist is also entitled to fifty per cent of any monies which the owner
receives from exhibition. The agreement is binding upon the parties for the lives of the
artist and his spouse plus twenty-one years, and the buyer agrees not to destroy, damage,
alter, modify or change the work. Gill & Solomon, Federal and State Resale Royalty
Legislation: "What Hath Art Wrought?", 26 UCLA L. Rev. 322, 327-32 (1978).
While this is undoubtedly a favorable contract for the creative artist, most do not have
sufficient bargaining power to demand its use and in the competitive atmosphere of the art
world works so encumbered may go begging for a purchaser. The number of possible
contractual arrangements is only limited by the imaginations of the artist and his attorney,
but the obvious drawback of buyer resistance remains. The final verdict on private contracts
as a means of protecting artists' rights has been summarized as "rarely obtained, fairly
ineffective, but better than nothing." Id. at 331. One commentator has suggested that the
use of contracts would be a more effective tool for the creative artist if the courts would
reverse their traditional tendency both to "interpret narrowly the rights retained by the
author ... [and] read broadly the rights which he conveys." See Comment, supra note 1, at
1557.
"' 194 Misc. at 573-75, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 816-19.
54 Id. at 576, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
" 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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Seuss. Geisel claimed that the dolls created by defendant were "tasteless,
unattractive and of an inferior quality," and destroyed the artistic
integrity of his original work.56 Geisel invoked section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act,5 7 which regulates unfair trade practices, to protect his
moral right. He argued that tags bearing the name "Dr. Seuss," which
were affixed to the dolls, mislead the public as to their origin and
damaged his artistic reputation. 58
The state court held that plaintiffs reliance on the Lanham Act did not
afford him protection. The defendant's tag, which read "Based on Liberty
Magazine Illustrations by Dr. Seuss" did not mislead the public as to the
true origin of the dolls. In fact, the tags clearly identified that Geisel's
illustrations had provided only the inspiration for the final product. 59
Although acknowledging the existence of the doctrine of moral right and
its integrity component in many European and Latin American coun-
tries,60 the court very accurately summarized the position of the doctrine
in the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions when it stated:
"[T]he doctrine of moral right is not part of the law in the United States
[citations omitted] except insofar as parts of that doctrine exist in our law
as specific rights-such as copyright, libel, privacy and unfair competi-
tion."61
Artists have used the more traditional causes of action to protect their
moral rights, and these analogues are deemed sufficient for that purpose
by many commentators. However, specific rights such as copyright, libel,
privacy, and unfair competition do not always accommodate themselves
to the unique needs of artists.
5 Id. at 333 (quoting plaintiffs complaint).
5 The Lanham Act, ch. 540, 1946, 60 Stat. 441 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125) (1985). This
federal statute prescribes misrepresentation and misdescription of the origin of goods and
services. Any false statement of fact as to origin may provide grounds for a § 1125(a) civil
action, since that section provides in part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex or use in connection with any
goods or services . . . a false designation of origin, or any false description or
representation . . . and shall cause such goods or services to enter into
commerce... shall be liable to a civil action by any person ... who believes that
he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or repre-
sentation.
Id.
.8 295 F. Supp. at 351.
59 Id. at 353.
60 Id. at 340 n.5.
61 1d.
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IV. THE ANALOGUE APPROACH
A. Justification
Many commentators have argued that it is not necessary to enact
moral rights legislation in the United States, as the rights of artists can
be adequately protected by traditional Anglo-American causes of action.
All that is needed, assert proponents of the analogue approach, is to put
familiar doctrines to novel uses,6 2 such as employing the right to
publicity to protect the use of one's name as a property right.63 For
example, one advocate of this approach asks: "Should not the right to
publicity also include the author's right to prohibit another from restrain-
ing growth of his reputation by exploiting his work without giving him
authorship credit?" 6 4 He further suggests that integrity rights could be
protected if art works were sold by a contract containing a clause which
granted the author a reversionary interest in his work and this would
afford him a protected right.65 The doctrine of waste could be invoked in
order to strike "'an ideal balance between conflicting desires of successive
owners.' "166
B. Weaknesses
It appears that while these suggestions have all the positive attributes
of creativity and invention, they represent an unnecessary contortionist
act. By following the lead of California and New York, and openly
acknowledging artists' personality rights, attorneys and courts could
avoid linguistic gymnastics and accomplish the goal of granting equitable
62 See, e.g., Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506, 538 (1955).
[C]ommon law principles, if correctly applied, afford an adequate basis for
protection of such rights .... There is a considerable body of precedent in the
American decisions to afford to our courts ample foundations in the common law
for the protection of the personal rights of authors to the same extent that such
protection is given abroad under the doctrine of moral right.
Id.
Comment, supra note 1, at 1545 ("[Tlhe right to claim paternity and the right of integrity
of the work can be secured in this country without the necessity of adopting the French
doctrine of moral right as a foreign import package. Instead these rights can be secured by
extension of existing American legal doctrines."). But see Amarnick, American Recognition
of the Moral Right: Issues and Options, 29 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 31 (1983);
Hathaway, American Law Analogues to the Paternity Element of the Doctrine of Moral
Right: Is the Creative Artist in America Really Protected? 30 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP)
121 (1983); Note, The Americanization of Droit Moral in the California Art Preservation Act,
15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 901 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Americanization].
63 Comment, supra note 1, at 1545-46.
64 Id. at 1546.
65 Id. at 1550-54.
66 Id. at 1551 (quoting 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 636, at 6 n.1
(5th ed. 1971)).
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relief to the artist. It is beyond the scope of this Note to explore in detail
the various American analogues to the moral right,6 7 but it is apparent
that this band-aid approach to the protection of artists' rights does not
squarely meet their needs. By employing various traditional actions,
artists have been able to secure some protection for what in practice are
their moral rights, but only when they can fit the facts of their particular
cases into a framework acceptable to the courts.68 Those cases which are
successful in protecting moral rights through analogous causes of action
are more often indicative of creative presentation on the part of the
lawyer than of a positive step for the recognition of artists' rights. As one
commentator stated: "[An artist should not be solely dependant upon
novel arguments by both bar and bench."69 The analogue approach has
been described both as "patchwork relief"70 and a "melange of doctrine
and statutes whose goals are not specifically those of giving recognition
to such interests [protection of artists' rights]." 71
This approach excludes too many potential artists' rights claims and
affords artists no opportunity to assert their paternity or integrity rights
in our present judicial system. "The view that common law analogues are
capable of providing protection equivalent to that of moral rights statutes
is a comfortable but falsely optimistic belief in the adequacy of the
present system ... a huge abyss separates droit moral from the feeble
'functional equivalents' found in American law."72
C. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos.
A consideration of the seminal case, Gilliam u. American Broadcasting
Cos., 73 is enlightening in terms of demonstrating the weaknesses of
restricting recognition of moral rights to traditional causes of action or, in
this instance, innovative interpretation of statute. Plaintiffs, a group of
British writers and performers professionally known as "Monty Python,"
sought a preliminary injunction in the Southern District Court of New
York to restrain the American Broadcasting Companies (ABC) from
67 See generally Hathaway, supra note 62 (American law analogues to the paternity
element of moral right are inadequate. A personal rights section should be added to the
1976 Copyright Act.); Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right", 16
AM. J. COMP. L. 487 (1968) (A wider application of recognized causes of action will ensure
artists' personality rights.); Comment, supra note 1 (A study of common law copyright,
publication and unfair competition offer comparable security to moral rights doctrine.)
6s The judiciary has seemed reluctant to deal with any arguments couched in "moral
rights" terms. See Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947); Crimi v. Rutgers
Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1949); Shostakovich v. Twentieth
Century Fox, 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1948).
6" Gantz, supra note 15, at 880.
70 Id. at 901.
7i Amarnick, supra note 62, at 61.
72 Note, supra note 62, at 904.
73 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
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broadcasting edited versions of three separate programs originally writ-
ten and performed by the group for broadcast by the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC).74
Pursuant to an agreement between Monty Python and BBC, there was
a detailed procedure to be followed in the case of any script changes prior
to recording of a program. 75 Although BBC retained final authority to
make changes, Monty Python was to exercise "optimum control over the
scripts consistent with BBC's authority and only minor changes were
allowed without prior consultation with the writers."76 There was noth-
ing in the agreement granting BBC any authority to alter a program once
it had been recorded.
In 1973 Time-Life Films acquired the right to distribute in the United
States a selection of BBC programs, including Monty Python. 77 Pursuant
to the distribution agreement between BBC and Time-Life, the latter was
allowed to edit the programs for purposes of commercials, censorship, and
time segment requirements. 78 Such a clause was not part of the agree-
ment between Monty Python and BBC.
In the first showing of the Monty Python program in the United States,
74 Id. at 17.
7i Id. at 17 n.2. The Agreement provided in part:
V. When script alterations are necessary it is the intention of the BBC to make
every effort to inform and to reach agreement with the Writer. Whenever
practicable any necessary alterations (other than minor alterations) shall be
made by the Writer. Nevertheless the BBC shall at all times have the right to
make (a) minor alterations and (b) such other alterations as in its opinion are
necessary in order to avoid involving the BBC in legal action or bringing the BBC
into disrepute. Any decision under (b) shall be made at a level not below that of
Head of Department. It is however agreed that after a script has been accepted by
the BBC alterations will not be made by the BBC under (b) unless (i) the Writer,
if available when the BBC requires the alterations to be made, has been asked to
agree to them but is not willing to do so and (ii) the Writer has had, if he so
requests and if the BBC agrees that time permits if rehearsals and recording are
to proceed as planned, an opportunity to be represented by the Writers' Guild of
Great Britain ... at a meeting with the BBC to be held within at most 48 hours
of the request (excluding weekends). If in such circumstances there is no
agreement about the alterations then the final decision shall rest with the BBC.
Apart from the right to make alterations under (a) and (b) above the BBC shall
not without the consent of the Writer or his agent (which consent shall not be
unreasonably withheld) make any structural alterations as opposed to minor
alterations in the script, provided that such consent shall not be necessary in any
case where the Writer is for any reason not immediately available for consultation
at the time which in the BBC's opinion is the deadline from the production point
of view for such alterations to be made if rehearsals and recording are to proceed
as planned.
Id.
76 Id. at 17.
77 Id.
7s Id. at 18.
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twenty-four minutes of the original ninety minutes of the recording were
omitted due to time requirements for commercial and editing of material
deemed offensive or obscene.79 After viewing this edited version the
group initiated negotiations with ABC and finally sought injunctive
relief to stop broadcast of the second special.80 After the evidentiary
hearing, Judge Lasker conceded that "'the plaintiffs have established an
impairment of the integrity of their work' which 'caused the film or
program .. . to lose its iconoclastic verve'... . '[T]he damage that has
been caused to the plaintiffs is irreparable by its nature."'8 However, the
injunction was denied for overriding reasons of questionable copyright
ownership and the possibility of financial injury to the defendant.8 2 The
court granted limited relief by requiring the broadcast of a disclaimer
during the special so that Monty Python could disassociate itself from the
edited broadcast.8 3 The order was stayed pending appeal to the Second
Circuit and ABC was permitted to broadcast the special with a brief
legend that the show had been edited by ABC.84
As a result of the subsequent appeal and the reversal of the district
court's decision by the Second Circuit, a new forum for vindication of
artists' rights emerged: section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.8 5 Concurring
with the lower court's holding that the injury to plaintiff's reputation was
irreparable, the Second Circuit acknowledged the intertwining nature of
economic and moral rights, and recognized that in this case the protection
of the paternity right would have significant impact on the subsequent
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
94 Id.
'1 538 F.2d at 24-25. For an explanation of § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, see supra note
57.
One of the first hints that a court might see fit to accommodate a moral right concept
under the Lanham Act was articulated in Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F.
Supp. 274 (1971)(Plaintiff, a foreign film director, attempted to recover from an American
film distributor for alleged garbling and distortion of the English version of the film.) While
denying injunctive relief in this instance the court suggested that the plaintiff might have
a cause of action under the federal trademark law if he could establish that his work had
been mutilated. The court stated:
Whether or not there is any square counterpart in American law of the "moral
right" of artists assertedly recognized on the European continent, there is enough
in plaintiffs allegations to suggest that he may yet be able to prove a charge of
unfair competition or otherwise tortious behavior in the distribution to the public
of a film that bears his name but at the same time severely garbles, destroys or
mutilates his work.
Id. at 278. It was not until five years later in Gilliam, however, that relief for distortion of
an artwork was granted under the auspices of the Lanham Act.
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pecuniary interests of the group.8 6 The court reasoned that by adversely
misrepresenting the quality of work produced by the group, many
potential fans would be unimpressed and refrain from supporting the
group's further activities in the United States. "The subsequent injury to
appellant's theatrical reputation would imperil their ability to attract the
large audience necessary to the success of their venture." v The court was
careful to articulate that a minimal level of editing would not constitute
an infringement of the copyright, but drew the line at some point prior to
the twenty-seven per cent in the instant case.8 8 At this level of editing,
the court found that an "actionable mutilation" had occurred. 89
It is significant to proponents of artists' rights that Gilliam acknowl-
edged the concept of moral right as the basis for action which seeks
redress for deformation of an artist's work, and recognized the non-
commercial, personal interest involved.90 Although the court first con-
ceded that "American copyright, as presently written, does not recognize
moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation since the law
seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of
authors,"91 it deftly acknowledged the importance and interrelationship
of both interests. It stated: "Nevertheless, the economic incentive for
artistic and intellectual creation that serves as the foundation for
American copyright law cannot be reconciled with the inability of artists
to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the
public on which the artists are financially dependent. '92 This recognition
of the dual nature of copyright underscored the deficiency of the copyright
system, which afforded protection only to economic interests. It also
pointed out the need for alternative methods of protection for artists'
rights.
86 538 F.2d at 19.
87 Id.
" Id. at 23. The court then cited previous decisions which established the right of
limited editing: Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1405 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(A licensee has the right so to alter a copyrighted work to suit his own style and
interpretation); Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd, 25 App. Div. 2d 830, 269 N.Y.2d 913, affd, 18 N.Y.2d 659,219 N.E.2d
431, 73 N.Y.2d 80 (1966)(When owner of moving picture authorized picture company to
show film on television without forbidding cutting, owner and producer-director could not
prohibit making of minor cuts for television exhibition. Custom in trade left discretion to
station as to which minor cuts were appropriate.)
s 538 F.2d at 23-24.
90 Krigsman, Section 43(a) of the Lanhan Act as a Defender of Artists' Moral Rights",
73 TRADE-MARK REP. 251, 269 (1983). It is notable that in its effort to accommodate the
personality rights of the artist in the Lanham Act, the majority opinion "is almost entirely
free of any residual trademark language, focusing instead on the artist's personal right
protectible under its provision." Id.
9i 538 F.2d at 24.
92 id.
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The court recognized the availability of analogous causes of action
based on contract law and prohibitions against unfair competition, and
interpreted positive decisions in such cases as a proper vindication of "the
author's personal right to prevent the presentation of his work to the
public in a distorted form."9 3 The court's holding in Gilliam, however,
seems to indicate an awareness of the inadequacies attendant upon these
more traditional causes of action. The court offered the artist another
avenue by which to protect his integrity and paternity rights-section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.94
In the instant case, the editing by ABC resulted in a product which the
court characterized as a "mere caricature" of the group's talent.95 The
court reasoned that presentation of such a mutilated version to the public
would create a false impression of the product's origin.96 By the novel
utilization of the Lanham Act in this case, the court was able to recognize
that "a valid cause of action for such distortion exists." The edited
representation of the program created by Monty Python amounted to a
misidentification of origin.97
The decision in Gilliam is in many ways a victory for the artist in his
assertion of personality rights, yet it must be noted that the case stands
for something less than total recognition of integrity and paternity
rights. The court clearly points out that Monty Python retained copyright
of the underlying script and was therefore within its rights in objecting to
any copyright infringement. 98 The BBC was also bound under clear
contractual terms vis-a-vis any alteration of editing rights.99 The BBC
had obviously exceeded the scope of its license by granting to ABC
greater rights than it owned. There is no clear indication that the court
would have been willing to recognize the Monty Python claim if the group
had not owned the underlying copyright and had not been protected by
the terms of the contract. Therefore, this holding offers only limited
protection under these enumerated circumstances, but offers no protec-
tion to fine artists who have sold their physical artwork and its copyright,
yet still wish to prevent is mutilation or destruction.
Although hailed for its enduring significance due to its "recognition
that the American legal system can accommodate the vigorous assertion
of artists' rights,"'10 0 the Gilliam decision has conversely been termed
93 Id.
9" See supra note 57.
9' 538 F.2d at 25.
9r Id. at 24.
" Id. at 25.
98 Id. at 19.
99 Id.
10 Note, The Monty Python Litigation-Of Moral Rights and the Lanham Act, 125 U. PA.
L. REv. 611, 634 (1977). Also supportive of this point of view is Krigsman, supra note 90, at
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inadequate. The Lanham Act can be applied only where work has been
both distorted and subsequently misrepresented as that of the original
artist's product. 10 While Gilliam and subsequent decisions10 2 demon-
strate a willingness on the part of some courts to expand the range of
actions available to assert personality rights, something more concrete is
needed to accomplish even-handed protection. For example, Judge
Gurfein, in his concurrence in Gilliam, repeatedly pointed out that the
Lanham Act is a trademark not a copyright statute. 0 3 There was no
need, he argued, to envoke the Lanham Act in this case when breach of
contract and copyright infringement provided adequate grounds for
reversal. 0 4 He recognized the majority's decision for what it was-an
attempt to give some recognition to moral rights. He saw no need to
extend the parameters of the Act and insisted that "the Lanham Act does
not deal with artistic integrity," but rather with misdescription, which
can be easily remedied by labeling. 0 5
Judge Gurfein's resistance to the use of the Lanham Act in the Gilliam
context is indicative of the checkered response that the analogue ap-
proach will continue to receive. One commentator, observing the accom-
modation of the unique needs of the artist in the Gilliam case, noted: "The
wolf dressed in sheep's clothing gets his dinner. The resourceful attorney
who can find a justiciable costume to disguise his client's moral wounds
can enter the courthouse to redress the harm inflicted on the artist."' ° Be
that as it may, dependence on a novel argument is too shaky a foundation
upon which to build a lasting structure of artists' rights. Legislative
275 (The Lanham Act, because of its dual regard for plaintiff and consumer "is especially
adaptable to protect the public interest in the national cultural heritage.").
loi Note, Monty Python and the Lanham Act: In Search of Moral Right, 30 RUTCERs L. REV.
452, 474 (1977).
112 See Noone v. Banner, 398 F. Supp. 260, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Former lead singer of
"Herman's Hermits" brought suit under Lanham Act and common law of unfair competition
to enjoin group from using the name "Herman's Hermits." District Judge Metzner
suggested a claim for relief pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), which grants reciprocal benefits
under the trademark law to persons from countries who are a party to any treaties or
conventions relating to trademarks, to claim relief under the Lanham Act.); National
Lampoon v. American Broadcasting Cos., 376 F. Supp. 733, 746-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(Publisher of collegiate satirical humor magazine sought to enjoin national television
network from using portion of title for a television pilot or program. Court held that plaintiff
had cause of action under Lanham Act, common law of unfair competition and New York
anti-dilution statute.); Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, 330 F. Supp. 274, 278 (1971)
(Plaintiff German film director attempted to recover from American film distributor for
alleged garbling and distortion of his film. The court suggested that plaintiff might have a
cause of action under the federal trademark law if he could establish that his work had been
mutilated.)
i03 538 F.2d at 26.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 27.
ie' See Krigsman, supra note 90, at 256.
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guidelines are necessary to clearly establish the rights and duties of
creative artists. The analogue approach of "[a]pplying a number of
unrelated doctrines to an intrinsically homogeneous subject matter
conceals the basic needs of visual artists.
'107
Recognition and acceptance of the unique relationship between an
artist and his creation necessitates a reevaluation of the rights of
property ownership. There are numerous barriers, however, to adoption
of the doctrine of moral rights in the United States.
V. BARRIERS TO ADOPTION OF ARTISTS' MORAL RIGHTS
A. Secondary Barriers
There are many feasible explanations for the United States' reluctance
to embrace the concept of moral right. At times, commentators and the
courts have demonstrated an almost phobic aversion to adoption of "this
so-called 'moral right"' from the continent, 1 S and have called for an
"Americanized" version of the concept.'0 9 This stance, and the America's
resultant refusal to join the Berne Copyright Convention, might be
viewed as a reflection of the spirit of isolationism which has played such
a large part in America's history of international relations."10 Our
reluctance to adopt the idea might also be traced to a feeling of
Anglo-American superiority. Such an approach is articulated in Adolph
Monta's rather condescending treatment of French droit moral in a
107 See Note, Americanization, supra note 62, at 909.
10. Vargas, 164 F.2d at 526. See generally Amarnick, supra note 62, at 73 (moral rights
doctrine "foreign and inappropriate"); Treece, supra note 67, at 505 ("Whatever may be the
prospect for interaction between the French and American systems of protection for
literary, musical and artistic works, it seems clear that the phrase 'moral right' is the wrong
phrase for heralding American law developments"); Comment, supra note 1, at 1545
(doctrine of moral rights is an unnecessary "foreign import package").
109 See J. WtHCHER, THE CREATIVE ARTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 23 (1965) (The American
equivalent of moral right should be developed not by "importing Moral Rights concepts
wholesale from abroad, but by developing them from native roots, in accordance with our
own common law traditions."); Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 1023, 1042-43 (1976) (The author argues against "rote adoption of the civil law moral
right." He states that "[i~nternational experimentation with the transplantation, as distinct
from the adaptation, of legal institutions has not been encouraging." We in America should
"develop our own method."). Accord Note, Americanization, supra note 62, at 910 (The
California Art Preservation Act is praised as "[ilt a tempts to integrate, rather than merely
append, various characteristics of the moral rights doctrine into American law.").
"o See Garland, Our Copyright Law: Growing Pains in International Society, 6 COPYRIGHT
L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 82 (1962) (The commentator points out that our accession to the
Universal Coyright Convention on September 16, 1955, marked the "first time that we had
joined in a major international agreement on Copyright."); Nimmer, supra note 16, at 547
("The reluctance to enter into international agreements is perhaps partly a product of the
isolationist tenets which guided American policy from the time of George Washington's
farewell address through the post WWI refusal to join the League of Nations.").
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speech delivered to the Los Angeles Copyright Society.11 ' He stated:
"[H]ere are two great concepts of copyright, each one with its merits; we,
as Anglo-Saxons tend to be rational and logical and more concerned with
practical considerations; the French are revoluntionary, emotional and
irremedially attached to idealistic principles."112
Opposition to expanded artists' rights has also emanated from "user"
groups such as the motion picture and television industries. They have
resisted the creation of any residual rights which are not capable of being
contractually modified,113 and view such expansion as seriously hamper-
ing their efforts to conduct business. In a call for a recognition of moral
rights in the form of a "national scheme," a commentator noted that
apprehension of antagonizing user industries within their state might
cause legislative bodies to be "fearful of enacting such legislation" even
though "those are the very states in which such laws are most needed. ' 14
Such apprehension has not resulted in total restraint, however, as both
California and New York, centers of the motion picture and art commu-
nities in the United States, have enacted legislation expanding artists'
rights. 115 A close look at the scope of the respective state statutes does
reveal, however, a certain accommodation to the interests of the user
groups, 116 and testifies to the powerful influence that these groups have
been able to wield in their opposition to the concept of moral rights.
Another obstacle to judicial recognition is the fact that, even in the civil
law countries of Europe such as France, West Germany, Italy and The
Netherlands, there is no one body of law consistently applied to the area
of moral rights." 7 The extent and duration of protection of the rights of
integrity and paternity differ from country to country and absent these
kinds of guidelines any court is placed in a difficult position.118 The
"' Speech by R. Monta to Los Angeles Copyright Society (Feb. 9, 1959), reprinted in
Monta, The Concept of "Copyright" Versus the "Droit D'Auteur", 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 177
(1959).
112 See supra note 111, at 185.
113 Gabay, The United States Copyright System and the Berne Convention, 26 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S. 202, 213 (1979).
14 See Amarnick, supra note 62, at 77.
115 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 986, 987, 989 (West 1985); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03
(McKinney Supp. 1986).
116 Both CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(b)(2) and N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01(9), 14.03(1)
exclude from the boundaries of their artists' rights legislation motion pictures and literary
works, those properties most utilized by the powerful entertainment industry.
11 J. WHICHER, supra note 109, at 12 n.13 ("Earlier assumptions that civil law countries
apply a sort of uniform code of 'Moral Right' have raised unnecessary difficulties in
American discussions of these concepts.").
118 See, e.g., Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80
N.Y.S.2d 575 (1948), affd, 275 App. Div. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949). This case involved
four internationally famous Soviet Russian music composers who attempted to enjoin the
producer of a motion picture from using their music and their names in credit tines in a
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American judiciary might well wonder just which version of moral right
it is being asked to adopt.1 19 Faced with this quandry, the courts have
responded in a predictable and even reasonable manner-they have
waited for direction from legislative bodies.
B. Primary Barrier
The greatest stumbling block to the adoption of moral rights in this
country, and the one which will continue to challenge head-on any
expansion of the paternity and integrity rights, is the traditional concept
of what constitutes ownership. It has indisputably been accepted in our
nation that bona fide owners of property possess itjus abutendi.120 By this
phrase is understood "the right to do exactly as one likes with property,
picture with an anti-Soviet theme. Since the music was in the public domain, it did not have
the benefit of copyright protection. The composers based their rights to relief on four
grounds; 1) the provision for injunctive relief contained in § 51 of the state Civil Rights Law
which afforded right of privacy; 2) the injunctive power of court to restrain publication of
defamatory matter; 3) deliberate infliction of injury without just cause; and 4) violation of
plaintifls moral rights as composers. Id. at 69, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 577. After rejecting the first
three grounds, the court turned to the question of moral right. It conceded that in "a proper
case" the court conceivably could "prevent the use of a composition or work in such a
manner as would be violative of the author's right." Id. at 70, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 578. However,
it then confronted the troubling problem of standards and questioned, "Is the standard to be
good taste, artistic worth, political beliefs, moral concepts or what is it to be? Id. at 71, 80
N.Y.S.2d at 579. While seemingly acknowledging that there was such a thing as moral
right, the court concluded that this case demonstrated no clear showing of infliction of a
willful injury or an invasion of a moral right. Id. The court succinctly stated the difficult
position of the judiciary in this matter by commenting: "In the present state of our law the
very existence of the right is not clear, the relative position of the rights thereunder with
reference to the rights of others is not defined nor has the nature of the proper remedy been
determined." Id.
119 See, e.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., concurring)
("'Moral right' seems to indicate to some persons something not legal, something
meta-legal ... It includes very extensive rights which courts in some American jurisdictions
are not yet prepared to acknowledge ... Finally, it is not always an unmitigated boon to
devise and employ such a common name."); J. WMCHLER, supra note 109, at 18 ("no-one has
ever undertaken to say which foreign country's legal concepts of this nature [moral rights]
should be selected for importation."). Whichler goes on to state:
The real danger inherent in the use of the 'Moral Right' label is ... that there
are so many enthusiasts for the uncritical adoption into American law of all the
rights gathered under this broad label abroad ... that any use of the label will
lead many to suppose that just such a substantive adoption of foreign concepts has
taken place.
Id. at 31.
120 See Note, Americanization, supra note 62, at 901 n.l. (Six metal sculptures by
Alexander Calder were purchased by the Fourth National Bank and Trust Co. of Wichita,
Kansas. When questioned concerning the bank's action of painting three of the artworks,
the Bank Chairman stated that as the bank owned the sculptures "we could paint them any
damn color we wanted to.").
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or having full dominion over [it]. ' 121 Blackstone, in his Commentaries,
argued that such property rights were necessary "to maintain peace and
harmony" and promote "the great ends of civil society."122 He stated that
"the public good is in nothing more essentially interested than in the
protection of every individual's private rights."'1 23 According to this
philosophy, there is no conflict between private rights and general
welfare, for the protection of the first benefits the latter. 24 History has
borne ample testimony that this result is not always the reality, and on
many occasions the state has found it necessary to restrict the property
rights of individuals in the futherance of the public interest.125 Never-
theless, the traditional concept of property recognizes ownership of
private property as a "formal right of the individual; secure from the
attacks of society even when it clearly conflicts with the public interest.
The end, the common good, can never justify the means-the violation of
individual's rights."126 Thus, the American legal tradition has long
cherished the two principles of free alienability of property and free
transferability of resources. "These two principles are designed to maxi-
mize the possible economic applications of property by giving the new
owner the right to exclusive use and enjoyment of the property sold or
otherwise transferred to him."1 27 Evolving from the common law limita-
tions on restraints on alienation emerged the "first sale doctrine" which
cut off any subsequent control by a seller over property he had sold.'
2 8
In the realm of artists' rights, it is necessary in certain instances to
restrict the property rights of owners. The question remains whether
these restrictions on property rights engendered by artists' rights legis-
lation can be accommodated in the American system ofjurisprudence, or
whether such interference with property rights is alien to our system.1 29
121 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 770 (5th ed. 1979).
122 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138.
123 Id. at *139.
124 R. SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 170 (1951).
121 See Gantz, supra note 15, at 875. "The Anglo-American legal system has long
recognized that society may impose some restraint on an individual's freedom to dispose and
use his property."
126 R. SCHLATTER, supra note 124, at 170.
127 Gantz, supra note 15, at 875.
12' See Nolan, All Rights Not Reserved After the First Sale, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 79
(1975).
121 See generally Merryman, supra note 109, at 1043 ("It should be emphasized, first, that
the moral right is the product of legal development in western, bourgeois, capitalist nations,
with whom we have deep cultural affinity."). The moral right doctrine has proven itself
compatible with the capitalist systems of France, Italy and West Germany. Neither the
United States nor the Soviet Union have adopted the doctrine.
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VI. PRECEDENT FOR RESTRICTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
There is a tradition in the United States of restriction of property rights
when the rights of the owner conflict with some important societal
interest. "The Anglo-American legal system has long recognized that
society may impose some restraint on an individual's freedom to dispose
of and use his property. This notion is reflected in a variety of legal
doctrines including nuisance laws, riparian rights, environmental laws,
zoning laws and cultural landmark preservation."'130 In these instances,
it has been held that there are situations where the interests of society
are superior to the private property interests of owners. For example, in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,13 ' Justice Brandeis, dissenting, stated
that the restriction upon the coal company's use of its property was a
deprivation of some rights previously enjoyed but went on to argue:
The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a
noxious use. The property, so restricted remains in the possession
of its owner. The State does not appropriate it or make any use of
it. The State merely prevents the owner from making a use which
interferes with paramount rights of the public. 132
Brandeis found that, for a restriction of property rights to be lawful, it
must be "an appropriate means to the public end."1 33 Justice Holmes, in
the majority opinion, stated that the principle fact to be considered in a
termination of such restriction was the extent of the diminution of the use
of the property. He conceded that the greatest weight is given to the
judgment of the legislature, though interested parties might always
maintain that the legislature had exceeded its constitutional powers. 134
In Morseburg v. Balyon,135 the defendant art dealer challenged the
constitutionality of the California Resale Royalties Act ' 36 and argued
that the required payment of a five per cent royalty after transfer of
ownership amounted to a restraint of his property rights. The district
court rejected his arguments and looked to the legal requirement that the
statute be "reasonable" and "appropriate to the public purpose justifying
its adoption."1 37 The court found that the "public purpose of promoting
130 See Gantz, supra note 15, at 875.
131 260 U.S: 393 (1922) (statute held unconstitutional taking which forbade the Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. from mining its own land when there was a residence on surface, even
though residents signed purchase contract specifically allowing such mining).
132 Id. at 417.
133 Id. at 418.
134 Id. at 413.
135 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 518 (1978), affd, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
983 (1980). See supra note 4.
1 CAL. CIv. CODE § 986 (West 1986).
137 201 U.S.P.Q. at 520.
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participation in the arts and encouraging equitable financial treatment
for artists outweighs any detriment suffered by plaintiff."13 After
balancing defendant's property rights against society's greater interest in
"moral and cultural strength,"'139 the court concluded that the State had
only "moderately compromised" defendant's rights in order to promote a
higher societal interest.' 40
Perhaps the best known statement of the proper balance of societal and
personal property interests, and the most topical to the issues of this
Note, is articulated in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.141 In
this case the Supreme Court was asked to delineate when considerations
of culture and aesthetics could justify restrictions on property interests.
New York City had adopted the Landmarks Preservation Law in 1965.142
Under the law, when a building was designated as an historical land-
mark certain restrictions were placed upon the property owner's options
concerning its use.' 43 The Court noted in its response to the defendant's
challenge of an unconstitutional taking that destruction of historic
structures and the belief that such structures "enhance the quality of life
for all" 4 had resulted in all fifty states and over 500 municipalities
enacting laws to encourage or require the preservation of buildings and
areas with historical or aesthetic importance. 45 While it is not the
purpose of this Note to discuss the various provisions of landmark
preservation statutes or the particular facts of Penn Central, the argu-
ments articulated by the Supreme Court in affirming restrictions on the
property rights of the owner seem particularly apropos.
Finding that the restrictions imposed on the owners of Grand Central
Station were substantially related to the promotion of the general
welfare, the Court reasoned that the application of the landmarks law
was not a "taking" of appellant's property.1 46 In a case of restriction of
real property interests, the Court looked to the economic impact of the
regulation, the character of the governmental action, and whether the
state had reasonably concluded that health, safety, morals or general
welfare would be promoted by legislation limiting particular uses of
property.1 47
The Court had earlier recognized in Berman v. Parker14s that the
138 Id. at 521.
139 Id. at 520.
140 Id. at 521.
141 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
142 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 (1976).
143 438 U.S. at 110.
144 Id. at 108.
145 Id. at 107.
146 Id. at 138.
147 Id. at 123-28.
148 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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legislature had the power "to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, [and] well
balanced as well as carefully patrolled."' 49 This position was firmly
reiterated in Penn Central when the Court stated that it would, before
considering the takings argument, emphasize what was not in dispute. It
then proceeded to cite cases in which it had recognized "in a number of
settings, that States and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls
to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable
aesthetic feature of a city."150
The analogy is obvious between statutes which restrict property rights
in furtherance of historical, cultural, and aesthetic goals, and artist's
rights legislation motivated by cultural preservation. Restriction of the
property rights of art owners is consistent with other cultural preserva-
tion legislation.
VII. NEW CONSCIOUSNESS AND PRIORITIZATION OF ARTIsTrc VALUES
Traditional property concepts appear to be in conflict with recent
artists' rights legislation such as the Resale Royalty Act, 151 which retains
for the original artist a pecuniary interest in his artwork nothwithstand-
ing transfer of ownership, and the Art Preservation Act,152 Act for
Preservation of Cultural and Artistic Creations, 15 3 and Artists' Author-
ship Rights Act,'54 which limit the freedom of an owner of artwork to do
as he likes with his property. Yet, rather than viewing moral rights
legislation as a violation of individual rights, certain restraints on
ownership of artistic works might be imposed in the common interest as
part of a changing consciousness and prioritization in the United States.
In his book The Greening of America,15 5 Charles Reich laments that "our
culture has been reduced to the grossly commercial; all cultural values
are for sale, and those that fail to make a profit are not preserved."15
6
This indictment is lent credence by the fact that American copyright law
addresses only pecuniary rights, and personality rights are not even
acknowledged. Reich observed that in the past we have desired changes,
but "we have tried wanting them without changing consciousness, that
is, while continuing to accept those underlying values that stand in the
149 Id. at 33.
0 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129.
151 CAL. CIv. CODE § 986 (West 1986).
152 Id. § 987.
153 Id. § 989.
154 N.Y. ARTS & CuLT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
'55 C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970).
'56 Id. at 8.
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way of what we want."'1 57 He deduced that "it is useless to seek changes
in society without changes of consciousness. Consciousness is prior to
structure."15 3
Legislation concerning artists' rights is representative of this change of
consciousness. It testifies to a growing recognition that more is involved
in the creation of an artwork than mere craftsmanship. Recognition of
moral right demonstrates a shift from the fundamental position in the
United States that
a work of art is like any other object of property, for legal
purposes, except as modified by the copyright law, and the
copyright law protects only property rights. The position in
France and other civil law countries is, on the contrary, that a
work of art is different for some legal purposes from other objects
of property so that the law of property must be appropriately
modified in order to deal properly with the special considerations
that are raised by works of art. 5 9
To recognize the importance of this difference, as recent legislation has
done, is to acknowledge the beginning of the new consciousness which
Reich finds so necessary to change.
Before a legal system will protect the moral rights of an artist in his
creation the following factors must coalesce:
(1) the recognition that an author puts himself, his personality,
into a literary work, and that this personal quality has intrinsic
value; (2) the attainment of a prestigious social position for the
literary and artistic crafts; (3) enough bargaining power among
artisans to give a certain degree of economic independence, or at
least the possibility of attaining it; and (4) a climate of freedom
and individual liberty which encourages personal creativity.160
The movement for expansion of artists' rights in the United States
indicates that art is achieving the recognition and position of importance
in our society which precipitates wide-spread legal protection.
15 Id. at 317.
158 Id. at 334.
' Merryman, supra note 109, at 1037.
1 0 Comment, supra note 1, at 1562 n.127.
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VIII. RECOGNITION OF MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. California Legislation
On January 1, 1980, the Art Preservation Act161 became operative in
California. While one commentator noted that "[t]he civil-law doctrine of
droit moral has recently been transplanted to the American statutory
landscape,"1 62 the California statute was not a mere carbon copy of its
civil law counterparts. The California legislature had paid heed to the
admonishment not to import a foreign doctrine and instead had tailored
the statute to the particular concerns and objectives of American society.
Emphasizing the public interest in the preservation of cultural heritage,
the California statute shifted the primary significance of moral rights
away from the civil law preoccupation with artistic reputation.
The legislative findings which prefaced the Act articulated a dual
purpose: to protect the artist's personality interest by prohibiting alter-
ation and destruction of fine art, and to protect the public interest in
preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations. 1 63 The position
of importance given to the latter is particularly significant as it is pivotal
in the creation of a uniquely American concept of artists' rights. While
the civil law countries protect the artist's rights of paternity and integrity
as an end in itself and therefore do not prohibit the ultimate destruction
of the artwork by a subsequent owner, the California doctrine views the
expansion of the rights of the individual artist as an integral part of the
larger purpose of art preservation in the public interest. It is this societal
purpose which proves the most substantial justification for whatever
modifications have occurred or will occur in the future development of
artists' rights and property interests, for it has already proven a success-
ful argument in aesthetic zoning and landmark preservation cases. As
Merryman stated:
Thus the interests of individual artists and viewers are only a
part of the story. Art is an aspect of our present culture and our
history; it helps tell us who we are and where we came from. To
revise, censor or improve the work of art is to falsify a piece of the
culture. We are interested in protecting the work of art for public
reasons, and the moral right of the artist is in part a method of
providing for private enforcement of the public interest. 164
161 California Art Preservation Act, ch. 409, § 1, 1979 Stat. 1501 (1980) (codified at CAL.
CIV. CODE § 987) (West 1986).
162 See Gantz, supra note 15, at 874.
163 CAL. CiV. CODE § 987(a) (West 1986).
'64 Merryman, supra note 109, at 1041.
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As with the Resale Royalties Act,165 fine art was restricted in the Art
Preservation Act to include an original painting, sculpture, drawing, or
an original work of art in glass. 166 The enactment of Section 997 of the
Civil Code in 1983 added porcelain painting and stained glass artistry to
this definition, and it is likely that as the doctrine gains acceptance the
list will be further expanded. Significantly, motion pictures and literary
works, properties most commonly utilized by the powerful entertainment
industry in California, were excluded from the definition. Their exclusion
would seem to be a politically expedient choice so as not to antagonize
these powerful interests and thereby endanger the fledgling moral rights
legislation.
An additional qualification to the application of the Act is that the
work be of "recognized quality."167 The determination of recognized
quality is left to the trier of fact, who is directed to rely on "the opinion
of artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art museums, and
other persons involved with the creation or marketing of fine art."168 It is
this requirement of recognized quality which veers sharply from the
traditional French doctrine of droit moral and establishes a unique focus
to the California legislation. In France the droit moral concerns itself
with the artist's reputation interests and does not hinge on society's
judgment as to the quality of the work.169 The very fact of being an artist
in France insures legal protection for one's work.1 70 The emphasis in the
California statute on recognized quality, while admittedly denying
protection to those whose work has not yet met with acclaim, is consonant
with the goal of art preservation in the general interest of society. In
effect, the state is selectively committing its protection and resources to
those works judged worthy of preservation.
By the terms of the Act, the artist retains the right at all times to claim
authorship or, for just and valid reason, to disclaim authorship of the
work.171 The Act also states that no one except the original artist who
owns and possesses a work of fine art "shall intentionally commit, or
authorize the intentional commission of, any physical defacement, muti-
lation, alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art."172 Neither may a
person who "frames, conserves, or restores a work of fine art.., commit,
or authorize the commission of, any physical defacement, mutilation,
alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art by any act constituting
165 CAL. CIv. CODE § 986(c)(2) (West 1986).
'6r Id. § 987(b)(2).
167 id.
168 Id. § 987(f).
169 See Note, Americanization, supra note 62, at 925.
170 Id. at 926.
171 CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(d) (West 1986).
172 Id. § 987(c)(1).
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gross negligence."173 The Act defines gross negligence as "so slight a
degree of care as to justify the belief that there was an indifference to the
particular work of fine art."'17
4
Any actions brought to enforce liability under the Act must be brought
within three years of the incident complained of, or one year after
discovery. 175 As testimony to the legislature's commitment to the protec-
tion of artists and their works, the remedies afforded to protect the
artist's personality rights include injunctive relief, actual damages,
punitive damages, reasonable attorney's and expert witness fees and any
other relief the court finds proper.' 76
The Act also addresses the complicated situation when fine art is an
integral part of a building. 177 This situation is more delicate in terms of
balancing property interests as the property owner may be only an acci-
dental owner of the artwork and have overriding interests in the dispo-
sition of the real estate, unlike the deliberate art purchaser. The Act treads
carefully in the realm of real property. If the work cannot be removed
without substantial mutilation or destruction, the rights and duties es-
tablished under the Act are deemed waived absent a written instruction
signed by the building owner and properly recorded. Such an instrument
would be binding on a subsequent owner. 178 If the work can be removed
without substantial mutilation, the rights and duties of the Act apply
unless the owners has diligently attempted to notify the artist or heirs and
has been unsuccessful or if the artist, after notification, failed within
ninety days to remove the work. 179 If the artist pays for removal, title of
the work shall pass to him.'8 o This provision demonstrates a careful
balancing of the property rights of the individual property owner, the
artist, and the society at large and allows every possibility to retrieve
works of art while respecting the owner's property interests.
The personality rights may not be waived except by a written instru-
ment so stating and signed by the artist,18 ' and may be exercised by the
artist, or his heirs, legatees, or personal representatives until the fiftieth
anniversary of the death of the artist.1 82 This time limitation, which
coincides with the copyright term, 8 3 is in contrast to the French
... Id. § 987(c)(2).
174 Id.
175 Id. § 987(i).
176 Id. § 987(e)(1)-(5).
177 Id. § 987(h).
178 Id. § 987(h)(1).
179 Id. § 987(h)(2).
180 Id.
181 Id. § 987(g)(3).
182 Id. § 987(g)(1).
183 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (The 1976 Copyright Act grants copyright protection for works
created after January 1, 1978, for a period of life of the author plus fifty years.)
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approach of perpetual rights but seems a reasonable compromise in the
face of opposition to recognition of rights which survive transfer of
ownership.
The California state legislature, in accordance with its avowed goal of
maintaining the cultural heritage in the public interest, next enacted the
Preservation of Cultural and Artistic Creations Act, which became
operative on January 1, 1983.184 This act provides a safeguard for
preservation of the integrity of an artwork after the fifty-year period of
statutory protection, or in the face of an indifferent artist or heirs. 185 In
order to effectuate its long-term goals of cultural preservation, the Act
establishes that "[a]n organization acting in the public interest may
commence an action for injunctive relief to preserve or restore the
integrity of a work of fine art from acts prohibited by subdivision (c) of
Section 987" of the Art Preservation Act.18 6 Fine art is consistently
defined with the prior act, but in addition to the requirement of
"recognized quality" is that of "substantial public interest."'187 This latter
requirement, while admittedly limiting the reach of the Act, can be
justified as a realistic attempt to focus the energy and attention of art
groups on the stated goal of the statute-the societal interest in preser-
vation of the cultural heritage. The organization being granted this right
to bring action is restricted to "a public or private not-for-profit entity or
association, in existence at least three years at the time an action is filed
pursuant-to this section, a major purpose of which is to stage, display, or
otherwise present works of art to the public or to promote the interests of
the arts or artists."188 The Act reflects a firm commitment to the idea that
works of fine art are an integral part of the cultural property of the
society at large, and therefore merit treatment which differs from that of
other property. In fact, the legislature made the express finding the
"there is a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and
artistic creations."'189
As with the Art Preservation Act, the legislature included remedies
sufficient to effectuate its purpose. The court may award reasonable
attorney's fees and expert witness fees to the prevailing party, in an
amount determined by the court. 190 This statute reflects the approach of
the Art Preservation Act in the removal of artworks from real prop-
erty.191 If such removal cannot be completed without substantial muti-
184 Preservation of Cultural and Artistic Creations Act, ch. 1517, § 3, 1982 Stat. 5886
1983 (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE § 989) (West 1986).
" Id. § 989(e)(2)(A).
186 Id. § 989(c).
111 Id. § 989(b)(1).
188 Id. § 989(b)(2).
189 Id. § 989(a).
190 Id. § 989(f).
181 Id. § 989(e).
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lation or destruction of the work, an organization may not bring an action
under this Act.192 If the organization "offers evidence giving rise to a
reasonable likelihood of removal, it may bring a legal action."193 In
furtherance of its preservational purpose, the Act requires that, in the
event that an artist or his heirs do not take action to remove the
endangered artwork after receiving notice, the building owner must place
a written notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the area where
the artwork is located. Any approved organization may then pay the cost
of removal and acquire title to the work. 194 If no response is elicited by the
notices, the owner may remove the work with no penalty, even if
mutilation or destruction results.195 This procedure, while acceptably
deferential to the rights of the property owner, demonstrates the serious-
ness with which the legislature views artistic and cultural preservation.
All possible avenues are made available either to artists, heirs, or public
interest groups to salvage artworks of recognized quality and of substan-
tial public interest.
California's legislative efforts on behalf of artists' rights have breathed
new life into the movement to establish moral rights in the United States.
By linking artists' rights to the larger purpose of cultural preservation,
the state has established a solid basis for public support and created a
domestic version of the civil law doctrine which is palatable to the
American public. Another state has subsequently enacted moral rights
legislation, but with a different purpose and emphasis.
B. New York Legislation
In 1984 New York followed the lead of California and passed the
Artists' Authorship Rights Act, which recognized the integrity and
paternity rights of artists. 19 6 In terms of paternity rights, the California
and New York acts are virtually identical, 97 but there is sharp diver-
gence in the sector of integrity rights. The New York statute more closely
resembles the civil law moral rights statutes with their emphasis on
artistic reputation. Unlike its California counterpart, the New York
statute surprisingly does not state any public interest in preserving
cultural and artistic creations. The legislative purpose states:
192 Id.
193 Id. § 989(e)(1).
194 Id. § 989(e)(2)(A)(ii).
195 Id. § 989(e)(2)(B).
" Artists' Authorship Rights Act, L. 1983, ch. 994, § 1 (codified at N.Y. ARTs & CuLT.
ArF. LAW §§ 14.51-.59) (McKinney 1984). See supra note 12.
'9' Both CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(d) and N.Y. ARTs & CuLT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(2)(a)(McKinney
supra 1986) use the identical phrase "shall retain at all times the right to claim authorship,
or, for just and valid reason, to disclaim authorship of his or her work of fine art."
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[T]he physical state of a work of fine art is of enduring and crucial
importance to the artist and the artist's reputation
therefore.., there are circumstances when an artist has the legal
right to object to the alteration, defacement, mutilation or other
modification of his or her work which may be prejudicial to his or
her career and reputation and that further the artist should have
the legal right to claim or disclaim authorship for a work of art.198
In harmony with its emphasis on reputation, the provisions of the Act
apply only to works of fine art knowingly displayed in places accessible to
the public or published or reproduced in the state. 199 Even then, display
is prohibited only if the work is presented in an altered, defaced,
mutilated or modified form as the work of the author, or is likely to
damage his reputation. 200 Outright destruction is not actionable under
the Act nor is mutilation of a work held in a private collection. A
mutilated work could be publicly displayed so long as authorship was not
attributed, and damage to the artist was not likely to result. In accor-
dance with the phraseology of the statute, an alteration to an artwork
might theoretically be judged an improvement and hence not harmful to
the artist's reputation and not actionable. The breadth of coverage
provided by this Act falls far short of the protection offered to the artist
in California. While this Act, despite its limitations, admittedly fulfills
the stated goal of protection of artistic reputation, the Act does not
demonstrate the far-sighted California view of protection of public
interest through preservation of cultural heritage.
The scope of the New York legislation, when originally enacted, was
wider than that of California, as it afforded protection to any original
work of visual or graphic art of any medium, excluding only sequential
imagery such as motion pictures. 20 1 While paintings, drawings, prints,
photographic prints, and sculpture were listed, the Act specifically stated
that the list was not definitive. 20 2 At the end of the first year of operation,
the scope of the Act was constricted to a newly defined class of fine art
consisting of "painting, sculpture, drawing, or work of graphic art, and
print, but not multiples."203 While the restricted definition of fine art for
the purposes of the Act is now more closely in line with the California
legislation, an important distinction remains. Within its scope of protec-
tion, the New York legislation applies to virtually all artists as there is
no requirement, such as that in California, that the work be of "recog-
198 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.55 historical note (McKinney 1984).
'99 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1)(McKinney Supp. 1986).
200 Id.
20' N.Y. ARnTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.51(5) (McKinney 1984).
202 Id.
203 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 11.01(9) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
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nized quality." The scope of this moral rights coverage echoes the French
approach that the mere fact of being an artist ensures protection. 204
If an artist wishes to enforce liability under the Act, the action must be
commenced within three years of the incident complained of or one year
after its constructive discovery. 205 The remedies afforded the artist are
"legal and injunctive relief. '20 6 This terse description of remedies would
seem to establish a much weaker enforcement mechanism than the
California statute, which lists injunctive relief, actual damages, punitive
damages, reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, and any other
relief the court deems proper.20 7
No mention is made in the Artists' Authorship Rights Act as to
duration of the paternity and integrity rights. The legislative findings
contain the only pertinent language and state that "[t]here are circum-
stances when an artist has the legal right to object to the
alteration . . . "208 (emphasis added). From this wording, one may
extrapolate that the rights granted under the Act may be enforced only
during the life of the artist. The California statute, on the other hand, has
prolonged applicability for an additional fifty years 2 9 and through
further legislation has now created perpetual protection. 21 0 The New
York Act does not address the possibility of contractual waiver of the
paternity and integrity rights, nor does it address the problem of artwork
as an integral part of real property. Overall, New York's rote adoption of
the civil law concept of droit moral does not prove satisfactory to the long
term needs of either artists or the larger society. The New York Act does
not secure for the artist the ultimate protection of his reputation-a
guarantee that the artist's works will be preserved for posterity.
IX. CONCLUSION
It is obvious that the doctrine of moral rights is gaining acceptance and
support in the United States. The use of analogous causes of action has
proven unsatisfactory, and the growing appreciation of art has led to a
new consciousness and priority for the concerns of the creative artist.
Merryman has observed that we are now at "the opportune historical
moment for consideration of this question: Given the cultural importance
of American art, should our law be modified in such a way as to protect
204 Supra note 170.
20 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
206 Id. § 14.03(4)(a).
201 See CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(e)(1)-(5) (West 1986).
20. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.55 legislative findings (McKinney 1984).
209 CAL. CiV. CODE § 987(g)(1) (West 1986).
210 Id. § 989.
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the integrity of works of art?"211 Two states, to varying degrees, have
answered in the affirmative and have moved to protect the paternity and
integrity interests of artists.
Scrutiny of the California and New York legislation reveals the
California Art Preservation Act as the superior model and the one
hopefully emulated by other states wishing to acknowledge artists'
personality rights. It is motivated by clear objectives, 21 2 and each section
is carefully tailored toward their accomplishment. While far from perfect,
and criticized by some commentators as too narrow in its range of
protection, 21 3 it is remarkably thorough and reflects careful preparation
and anticipation of contingencies. The New York legislation, while
certainly an advance for artists' rights in the state, does not reflect the
effort displayed in the Art Preservation Act to anchor artists' rights to a
concept such as cultural preservation which has already received public
and judicial acceptance. Although adoption of paternity and integrity
rights necessarily imposes certain restrictions on property rights there is
precedent for such a development, and the restrictions are minor when
balanced against the societal goal of preservation of our culture.
COLLEEN P. BATTLE
211 Merryman, supra note 109, at 1042.
212 See supra note 163.
211 See Note Americanization, supra note 62, at 918, 922 (The requirement of a showing
of intent, "a very significant restriction on the effective reach of the legislation, necessitates
distinguishing between deliberate and accidental damage .... The Act creates a diluted
form of the right of integrity under droit moral."). For a general critical discussion of the Art
Preservation Act, see Petrovich, Artists Statutory Droit Moral in California: A Critical
Appraisal, 15 Loy. L. REV. 29, 41 (1981) (definition of fine arts too narrow); cf. Duffy,
Royalties for Visual Artists, 7 PERF. ARTS REV. 560, 574 (1977) (Although the article deals
with Resale Royalties Act, the two statutes share the same definition of fine arts and
therefore the same criticism in this area applies: "[Wlhy should artworks such as paintings
and sculpture be distinguished from other 'artistic' endeavors?").
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